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Article 3

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

THE MARYLAND LAW OF STRIKES, BOYCOTTS,
AND PICKETING
By LEONARD E. COHEN*
Maryland labor lawyers are sometimes faced with the
situation in which a relatively small business is being
struck, boycotted, or picketed by a labor union, or is threatened with such measures. The question immediately arises
whether such activity is permissible. If the business is
engaged in or affects interstate commerce, then there is
a large body of federal labor law which is applicable.
The National Labor Relations Act 1 (hereinafter called
"NLRA"), provides that some types of strikes, boycotts,
and picketing are unfair labor practices and, therefore,
illegal. For example, the NLRA prohibits picketing which
has as its object the forcing of an employer to recognize a
union as the representative of his employees when another
union has been certified by the National Labor Relations
Board (hereinafter called "NLRB") as the representative
of such employees.' The problems existing under federal
labor law have been thoroughly discussed by other writers,
and it is not the intention of this article to repeat such discussions. Rather, the purpose of this article is to consider
the legality of strikes, boycotts, and picketing in situations
where federal labor law does not apply. Such a situation
would occur if the business involved did not engage in or
affect interstate commerce. Also, under a recent amendment to the NLRA, it seems that federal labor law would
not apply when the business affected interstate commerce
to such a small extent that the NLRB refused to take
jurisdiction over it.3 In either situation, the question would
be primarily one of state law, and this article will attempt
to describe the rather skimpy Maryland law which does
exist in this area.
As an illustration of the type of problem which will be
discussed, assume that a tavern located within Baltimore
City employs three bartenders. Everything sold in the
tavern is purchased from distributors which are themselves
* A.B. 1953, Johns Hopkins University, LL.B. 1958, Harvard Law School;
Member, Baltimore City Bar.
129 U.S.C.A. (1956) §§ 151-168. Another federal statute in the labor field
is the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. (1954) §§ 151-63, 181-88. However,
this act will not be discussed since its application is limited to railroads
and airlines.
229 U.S.C.A. (1956)
§ 158(b) (4) (C).
I See discussion, infra, circa, n. 14.
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located within Baltimore City. The tavern makes no purchases or sales directly outside of Maryland. A union
claims to represent all of the employees of the tavern, but
the union refuses to submit proof of its authority. When
the owner of the tavern refuses to recognize the union, a
picket line appears in front of his establishment. As another illustration, assume that a trucking company serves
small retail stores within Baltimore City. The company
employs five truck drivers, who are not members of any
union. In an attempt to organize the employees of the company, a union calls a strike of its members who are employed at several of the retail stores served by the company. In both of the above illustrations, it is reasonable to
assume that only intrastate commerce is involved, or that
the NLRB would refuse to take jurisdiction. Thus, the
question would be whether the employer in such cases is
entitled to relief under Maryland law.
Before the relevant Maryland law in this area can be
discussed, it will be necessary to mention very briefly two
issues which could determine whether Maryland law would
even apply. These two issues are whether federal law has
preempted the area, and whether there is a constitutional
right to picket which could not be abridged by the state.
PREEMPTION OF STATE'S LABOR JURISDICTION
BY NLRA

In a series of decisions the Supreme Court of the United
States has indicated that when federal labor law controls
a situation, the states have no authority to act in the
matter.' The typical case involved an attempt by an employer to obtain relief from a state court or board against
union activity which violated the NLRA and thus was subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. In such a situation,
the Court ruled that the federal law had preempted the
field, and that the employer's only recourse would be
the NLRB.
Until recently it was believed that states might have
greater authority to award damages than to grant injunctions in this area. This belief was fostered by several cases
which contained language supporting such a conclusion.'
However, in San Diego Unions v. Garmon, the Supreme
'E.g., Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957): Weber v. AnhenserBusch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955)
Garner v. Teamsters Union, ,346 U.S. 485
(1953).
'E.g., Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United
Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
6359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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Court recently held that such is not the case, that a state
court cannot award damages in a situation where it could
not grant an injunction. The Court distinguished the earlier
cases, which had permitted state courts to award damages,
on the ground that those cases involved violence and imminent threats to the public order, which were legitimate
matters of state concern.
In discussing whether strikes, boycotts, and picketing
are controlled by federal law, it is necessary to distinguish
between three types of activity: (1) that which is protected by federal law; (2) that which is prohibited by
federal law; and (3) that which is neither protected nor
prohibited by federal law. For example, Section 7 of the
NLRA provides that "employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection. . . . " It is clear, therefore, that strikes,
boycotts, and picketing are protected by federal law to
some extent. For example, if an employer engaged in
interstate commerce refused to grant a wage increase during negotiations with a union, and the union subsequently
called a strike and peacefully picketed the employer, such
activity would clearly be protected by federal law.
On the other hand, the NLRA prohibits various types of
union activity. For example, Section 8(b) (4) (B) of the
Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to induce
employees of any employer to engage in a strike where an
object thereof is "forcing or requiring any person to cease
using, selling, handling, transporting or otherwise dealing
in the products of any other producer, processor or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ....-I Thus, if in the above-described situation, the
picketing was extended to companies dealing with the company with which the union had the dispute, with the purpose of causing strikes at such companies, such picketing
would be a violation of the NLRA.
Suppose, however, that the union put pressure on the
company by calling intermittent and unannounced work
stoppages. In such a case, the activity would not be a violation of the NLRA. On the other hand, such tactics are
considered improper and therefore not within the protec7

29 U.S.C.A. (1956) § 157.
129 U.S.C.A. (Cum. Supp. 1959) § 158(b) (4) (B).
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tion of federal law.sa Thus, the activity would be neither
protected nor prohibited by federal law.
The Supreme Court decisions state rather clearly that
when activity is either protected or prohibited by federal
law, the states cannot regulate it. San Diego Unions v.
Garmon' also states that when the NLRB has not determined the legality of conduct under federal law, and the
conduct arguably falls within the compass of federal law,
the states may not regulate the conduct. But, if it appears
that the activity is neither protected nor prohibited by
federal law, it is not clear whether the states may regulate
it. One Supreme Court case suggests that they may.10 However, the following quotation from the Garmon case shows
that the issue is not yet settled:
"If the Board decides, subject to appropriate federal
judicial review, that conduct is protected by § 7, or
prohibited by § 8, then the matter is at an end, and the
States are ousted of all jurisdiction. Or, the Board may
decide that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited, and thereby raise the question whether such
activity may be regulated by the States. * * *"

In the above discussion, it has been assumed that when
the NLRA governs a situation, the NLRB, which enforces
that law, will take jurisdiction over the matter. However,
such an assumption is not always correct. The NLRB has
formulated standards to govern its jurisdiction, and such
standards fall short of encompassing all of the businesses
which engage in or affect interstate commerce. 2 This situation results from the NLRB's belief that its budget does
not enable it to handle all of the cases which fall within
its jurisdiction under the NLRA, and that therefore it must
refase to exercise jurisdiction over businesses which have
only a slight effect on interstate commerce. Thus, there
arose what was known as a "no-man's land" in which the
states did not have jurisdiction and in which the NLRB
refused to take jurisdiction. This phenomenon resulted
from the decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Board.3 A union
81See Auto Workers v. Wis. Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) ; Labor Board v.
Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
0 Supra, n. 6.
10Auto Workers v. Wis. Board, supra, n. 8a.
11Supra, n. 6, 245. In ,this case, at p. 245, n. 4, the Court also stated that
Auto Workers v. Wis. Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949), "has not been followed
in later decisions, and is no longer of general application."
2 See 42 L.R.R.M. 96 (1959), 1 CCH LABOR LAW REPoRTER
1610.
-8353 U.S. 1 (1957).
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charged a small Utah company with engaging in activities
that were unfair labor practices under both the NLRA
and the Utah Labor Relations Act. The company's dealings
outside of the state were very limited; and under its jurisdictional standards effective at that time, the NLRB refused to take jurisdiction over the company. When the
NLRB refused to act upon the union's charges, the union
filed the same charges with the Utah Labor Relations
Board. The Utah Board found that it had jurisdiction and
concluded on the merits that the company had engaged in
unfair labor practices under the Utah Act. The Supreme
Court of the United States held that the Utah Board did
not have jurisdiction in the case since the company was
engaged in interstate commerce to some extent. The Court
felt that federal law had completely preempted the field
even though the NLRB refused to exercise its jurisdiction.
The Guss case produced a paradoxical situation whereas some types of activity were prohibited by both
federal and state law, the NLRB would not, and the states
could not, enforce the prohibitions. This situation has been
remedied in two ways. First, in 1958 the NLRB revised its
jurisdictional standards drastically to include many more
businesses. ,a Also, a recent amendment to the NLRA
permits the states to exercise jurisdiction in cases where
the NLRB has jurisdiction but declines to exercise it. 4
Although the recent statute is not absolutely clear, its
legislative history seems to indicate that the states may
apply their own law, and need not follow federal law in
such cases. 5 Apparently, when the NLRB refuses to take
jurisdiction over a business, the business is treated as if
it did not engage in or affect interstate commerce. It is
conceivable that this amendment could be interpreted to
mean that states may take jurisdiction over such cases but
that the applicable law is to be federal; however, such an
interpretation seems unlikely.
In all of its preemption decisions the Supreme Court
has recognized the right of the states to regulate violence
13,See

supra, n. 12.
1 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.A.
(Cum. Supp. 1959) § 164(c) (2).
15105 Cong. Rec. 14206, 14214, 14221. Such a conclusion is also supported
by the fact that the Senate bill provided that state agencies could exercise
jurisdiction over companies when the NLRB refused to exercise ilts jurisdiction, providing that such agencies applied federal law. This provision
was eliminated by the conference committee. Conference Rep. 1147, U.S.C.
Cong. & Ad. News (1959) 2503, 2509. See also, Cox, The Landrum-Griffn
Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 257,
261-262 (1959).
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and threats of violence.16 Thus, there is no question that
the states can enjoin fights, destruction of property, and
other conduct of this type under the police powers of the
state. It often becomes difficult, nevertheless, to decide
whether a state may also prohibit peaceful activity which
seems to be governed by federal law, when such activity
has resulted in instances of violence. This problem usually
arises in connection with picketing, where strikers and nonstrikers often meet fact to face and tempers grow short.
A recent Supreme Court case, Youngdahl v. Rainfair,
Inc.,17 presents a good illustration of this problem. A company in a small community had just over a hundred employees, about one-third of whom engaged in a strike and
picketing to compel the company to recognize a union.
Various acts of violence and threats of violence resulted,
such as puncturing automobile tires, threatening the plant
manager, name-calling as the non-striking employees came
to and left work, and breaking a window in the plant. The
Court held that the state court could enjoin future violence
or threats of violence, but that it could not prohibit picketing per se since the pattern of violence was not so connected with the picketing that an injunction against violence would be ineffective if the picketing were permitted
to continue.
In reaching this decision, the Court expressly distinguished an earlier case in which it had permitted a state
court to enjoin all picketing because of the threat of violence. In Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Co.,"8 a labor dispute resulted in picketing accompanied by various forms
of violence, such as smashing windows, exploding bombs in
plants, wrecking trucks, and beatings. The state court reasoned, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the unusual
amount of violence had created an atmosphere of fear and
intimidation, and that further picketing, even though peaceful, would perpetuate this atmosphere. The Supreme Court
did not frame the issue in the Meadowmoor case as being
whether federal law had preempted state law; rather, it
asked whether the United States Constitution prevented a
state court from enjoining picketing (a problem which is
discussed below' 9 ). Nevertheless, the issues in the Youngdahl and Meadowmoor cases are similar, and a comparison
"1E.g., San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) ; United Workers
v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) ; Auto. Workers v. Wisconsin
Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
7355 U.S. 131 (1957).
18312 U.S. 287 (1941).
"See infra, circa, ps. 236-238.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

of the two cases is very helpful in understanding the
Supreme Court view in this area.
In summary, the doctrine of preemption at the present
time seems to have the following effect on the applicability
of Maryland labor law to Maryland businesses: If a business does not engage in or affect interstate commerce,
Maryland has jurisdiction over union activity concerning
the business and may apply Maryland law. If the NLRB
refuses to take jurisdiction over a business, Maryland has
jurisdiction and probably may apply Maryland law. If the
NLRB takes jurisdiction over a business, and the union
activity is either prohibited or protected by federal law
(or if the NLRB has not determined the status of the
activity under federal law but it arguably is prohibited
or protected), Maryland has no jurisdiction over such activity. If the NLRB takes jurisdiction over a business, and
the union activity is neither prohibited nor protected by
federal law, it is not settled whether Maryland has jurisdiction. In any situation involving violence or public disorder, Maryland may act to regulate such breaches of
the peace.
PICKETING AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

It is settled law that picketing is to some extent a means
of expression and as such is protected by the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment as incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
It is also recognized that picketing is a form of coercion
and thus is in a different category from other means of
expression. The problem of reconciling the free speech
aspect with the coercion aspect of picketing has proved
very difficult. There is no question that violent types of
picketing, such as mass picketing which blocks ingress and
egress, or picketing accompanied by harm to persons or
property, is not protected by the Constitution and may be
regulated by the states.2" As discussed above, in some instances violence becomes so closely connected with picketing that even the peaceful aspects of the picketing may be
prohibited.2 1 A problem also arises when picketing is conducted peacefully but the object of the picketing seems to
conflict with the public policy of a state, so that the picketing appears to be a means of coercion for an illegal end. It
can be argued that such picketing is no more protected
1 See Hotel Employees' Local v. Wis. Board, 315 U.S. 437 (1942) ; Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Co., 8upra, n. 18.
21 See supra, ps. 234-230.
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than verbal threats for the purpose of extortion. The main
problem has been how far the states can go in enforcing
their public policy as a means of regulating picketing.
Two of the early leading cases in this area are Thornhill
v. Alabama2 2 and A.F. of L. v. Swing". The Thornhill case
settles beyond doubt that peaceful picketing enjoys some
constitutional protection. In this case the Supreme Court
of the United States held unconstitutional an Alabama statute which prohibited all picketing for the purpose of inducing persons not to trade or deal with a business. The
statute as interpreted was not limited to picketing with
an unlawful object or conducted in an unlawful manner.
In the Swing case the Court went farther than in the
Thornhill case by holding that a state court could not
enjoin peaceful organizational picketing. A union had tried
to organize the employees of a beauty parlor, and when
its efforts failed, the union picketed the shop. The Supreme
Court of Illinois had held that such picketing might be
enjoined since it was a violation of the common law policy
of the state for a union to picket when there was no dispute
between the company and its employees.
In a series of subsequent cases the United States
Supreme Court has withdrawn from the position enunciated in the Thornhill and Swing cases, and apparently
has overruled the Swing case sub silentio. In Giboney v.
Empire Storage Co.,2 4 the Court held that a Missouri court
could enjoin a union, which was attempting to organize
peddlers, from picketing a wholesale dealer to force him
to agree to stop dealing with non-union peddlers. Under
the law of Missouri, such an agreement would have constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of
the state anti-trust laws. In Building Service Union v.
Gazzam,25 a union unsuccessfully attempted to organize a
small hotel, and the owner refused to sign a contract with
the union as the bargaining agent for his employees. When
the union began to picket the hotel in an attempt to gain
recognition, a state court enjoined the picketing on the
ground that the object of the picketing was in violation
of the state statute prohibiting employer coercion of employees in their choice of a bargaining representative. The
Supreme Court held that the injunction was valid.2 6
"310 U.S. 88 (1940).
-312 U.S. 321 (1941).
-336 U.S. 490 (1949).
2339

U.S. 532 (1950).

See also Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Teamsters
Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
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In a recent case, Teamsters Union v. Vogt., Inc.,"' a
union unsuccessfully sought to organize the employees of
a company operating a gravel pit in Wisconsin. The union
began to picket the entrance of the company's place of
business with signs reading that the men on the job were
not affiliated with the A. F. of L. Drivers of several trucking companies refused to deliver to the company and
thereby caused substantial damage to the company. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the picketing could
be enjoined on the ground that the objective of the picketing was to coerce the employer to interfere with the right
of its employees to join or refuse to join the union, which
action by the employer would have been in violation of
a Wisconsin statute. The United States Supreme Court
held that the picketing could be enjoined without violating
the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter examines the history of the
picketing cases and demonstrates that the Court has
changed its viewpoint greatly since the earlier cases. While
the Court did not overrule A. F. of L. v. Swing, the facts
of the Vogt and Swing cases are substantially identical, and
it would be difficult to discover a meaningful distinction
between them.
The decisions regarding the constitutional right to
picket have followed a serpentine course, and it is difficult
to predict with certainty what the future holds. The present law seems to be that the Constitution prevents a state
from prohibiting peaceful picketing per se,25 but does not
prevent a state from prohibiting picketing for an objective
which violates state policy even though such picketing is
entirely peaceful.
MARYLAND LABOR LEGISLATION

The public policy of Maryland in regard to strikes,
boycotts, and picketing is almost entirely a creation of the
Maryland judiciary. While some of the other states have
detailed labor legislation, the Maryland statutes regulating labor relations are very few and of limited importance. Many states have labor boards which exercise
functions similar to those of the NLRB in the federal
sphere. Although Maryland has a Commissioner of Labor,
his authority is very limited. In general, his chief func- 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
'The Supreme Court recently relied solely on the Thornhill case in
reversing per curiam a Kansas decision; Chauffeurs Local Union 795 v.
Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958).
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tions are to seek mediation and arbitration of labor disputes which may result in strikes or lockouts, to investigate
and publish a report on disputes when he has failed to
secure mediation or arbitration, and to conduct elections
for the selection of labor representatives when the parties
consent to such an election. The only sanction available to
him is to publish in newspapers his findings in labor disputes, which findings may designate the party at fault.2 9
Such adverse publicity may be harmful to many businesses, but in general this sanction seems to have little
effect. Thus, the Commissioner provides services when the
parties desire them, but he has almost no authority to
regulate labor disputes when the parties elect self-help.
The Maryland statute of most importance in this area
is the Anti-Injunction Act,3" which is patterned after the
federal Norris-La Guardia Act."l This statute declares the
policy of Maryland to be that employees should have full
freedom to organize and to negotiate the terms and condition of their employment through representatives of their
own choosing.3 2 The purpose of the act is to place restrictions upon the power of courts of equity to grant injunctions in labor disputes. This purpose reflects the
feeling in this country during the 1930's that courts of
equity were unduly hampering the labor movement by
enjoining necessary and proper union activities, especially
by means of ex parte injunctions.3 3
The act implements its purpose in two ways. First, it
prevents a court from prohibiting, by means of a restraining
order or a temporary or permanent injunction, inter alia,
the following types of activity:
(1) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment regardless of any
promise or agreement to the contrary.
(2) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization regardless of any promise to the contrary.
(3) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, a labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, or picketing, so long as such activity is not coercive,
violent, or otherwise unlawful.
(4) Ceasing to patronize or employ any person.
8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 89, §§ 1-13.
8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, §§ 63-75.
-129 U.S.C.A. (1956) §§ 101-10, 113-15.

'0

"8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, § 63.
See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THIE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 24-46, 53-60,

64-66.
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(5) Assembling peaceably to do or to organize any of
the above acts.
(6) Advising any person of the intention to do any of
the above acts.
. (7) Agreeing with other persons to do any of the above
acts.
(8) Advising, urging or inducing without fraud, violence, or threat thereof, others to do the above acts.
(9) Doing in concert any or all of the above acts on the
ground that the persons engaged3 4therein constitute an unlawful conbination or conspiracy.
Second, the act sets forth specific procedural requirements which must be met before a court may issue a
temporary or permanent injunction in a labor dispute.
Preliminarily to the granting of an injunction, the court
must hear the testimony of witnesses opposing the injunction, and make the following findings:
(1) That unlawful acts have been threatened or committed and will be executed or continued unless restrained.
(2) That substantial and irreparable injury will follow.
(3) That greater injury will result from the denial of
an injunction than will be inflicted by the granting of an
injunction.
(4) That the activity in question is not protected from
an injunction by another provision of the act.
(5) That the complainant has no adequate remedy at
law.
(6) That the police have failed or are unable to furnish
adequate protection to the complainant's property. 5
However, the statute provides that a court may issue
a temporary restraining order before a hearing is held if
the complainant alleges that substantial and irreparable injury will be unavoidable. A court may issue such a restraining order only upon testimony or, in the discretion of
the court, upon affidavits which would support a temporary
injunction if a hearing were held. Before granting such
a restraining order, the court must allow a reasonable time,
but not less than forty-eight hours, for the parties sought
to be restrained to show cause why the restraining order
should not issue. Generally, the restraining order is effective for only five days. There is the further provision
that no restraining order or injunction may issue unless
the complainant has made every reasonable effort to settle
the dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any
8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, § 65.
"8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100,

§ 68.
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available method of mediation or arbitration, unless delay
would cause irreparable injury."
As shown by the above description, one part of the AntiInjunction Act protects certain types of union activity
from a court injunction, while another part of the act sets
forth the procedure which must be followed before a court
may issue a labor injunction. Although these two parts do
not fit together as nicely as possible, the intent seems to be
that activities described in the first part of the act may
never be enjoined and that other activities resulting from
labor disputes may be enjoined, if at all, only after the
statutory procedures have been followed. In general, it
seems that the first part of the act is concerned with peaceful conduct while the second part presupposes the existence of violence.
The Anti-Injunction Act applies only to cases involving
"labor disputes," and its definition of such cases seems to
include almost every conceivable labor dispute:
"(a) What constitutes labor dispute. - A case
shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged
in a single industry, trade or craft, or occupation; or
who are employees of one employer . . . or when the
case involves any conflicting or competing interest
in a 'labor dispute' * * *
"(c) Labor dispute defined. - The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representations of person [sic] in negotiation,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning employment relations or any other controversy arising out
of the respective interests of employer or employee,
regardless of whether or not the stand disputants in the
proximate relation of employer or employee.''"
Nevertheless, the Maryland courts have held that the
act was not intended to apply in many situations apparently covered by its language. The cases raising this question are discussed below.3
The following Maryland statute provides that not all
union activity is to be considered a criminal conspiracy:
S8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, § 69.
8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, § 74.
"See infra, circa, ps. 250-258.
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"An agreement or combination by two or more
persons to do or procure to be done an act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and workmen, shall not be indictable as a
conspiracy, if such act, committed by one person,
would not be punishable as an offense; nothing in this
section shall affect the law relating to riot, unlawful
assembly, breach of the peace, or
any offense against
'39
any person or against property.
However, this statute, which originated in 1884, has not
been relied on as an analogy in civil litigation and therefore
seems of minor importance to our problem.
Another Maryland statute sets forth the usual prohibition of sit-down strikes. Violation thereof, by either
the employees involved or by any union directing their
actions, constitutes a criminal offense.4"
EARLY LABOR PROBLEMS IN THE COURTS

Since the labor law of Maryland is largely a result of
judicial decisions, it seems appropriate to provide a brief
background of the judicial approach to labor law in this
country.4 When unionism was in its infancy, and employers challenged the right of unions to cause injury to
businesses by means of strikes, boycotts, and picketing,
the courts turned to the law of conspiracy, which seemed
to apply to the collective harm involved. That law prohibited persons from acting in concert for an illegal or
perhaps immoral aim. It also prohibited persons from
using unlawful means to achieve a legitimate aim. From
this background, the courts generally applied two tests in
determining the legality of union activity: (1) Were the
objectives lawful? (2) Were the means lawful?4 2 However, it was often difficult to apply such general tests to the
variety of situations which developed. Violence was
clearly unlawful, but what about peaceful picketing which
had the effect of ruining a valuable business? Was it
""3 MD.CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 37.
'03 MD.CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 552. At one time there was a Maryland

statute regulating labor disputes involving public utilities; however, the
sta'tute expired by its own terms in 1957 ,and was not re-enacted. 8 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 89, §§ 14-24.
41For an excellent discussion of this subject, with special emphasis on
Maryland law, see LAUCHH IMER, THE LABOR LAW OF MARYLAND (1919)
19-45.
42 See e.g.,
Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912 (8th Cir. 1897) ; Central
Metal Products Oorporation v. O'Brien, 278 F. 827 (N.D. Ohio 1922) ; Plant
v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900) ; and Vegelahn v. Guntner,
167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
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lawful to strike Employer A, with whom the union had no
dispute, to cause him to stop dealing with Employer B,
with whom the union had a dispute, in an attempt to put
pressure on Employer B?
Questions of this type - the ones posed represent only
a few of the problems which arose - are not always susceptible of clear and obvious answers. For example, one
question which arose early, and which sometimes still
creates uncertainty today,4 3 is whether it is against public
policy for a union to try to force employees of a company
to join the union against their will by picketing the company, secondary pressure on the customers of the company,
appeals to the public not to patronize the company, and the
like. At first glance such an objective seems against the
American tradition of freedom of choice, and many states,4 4
including Maryland,4 5 today condemn tactics with such
a purpose. However, unions which were struggling for
a foothold in American industry claimed that it should
be permissible for them to force unionization of a
company. They argued that if Employer A was unionized,
and Employer B, his direct competitor, was not, it would be
impossible for the union employees of Employer A to
enjoy wages and benefits much in excess of those given
by Employer B. Employer A would not be able to afford
labor costs much greater than those paid by his competitor,
and in effect Employer B would be governing to a great
extent the. wages and benefits of the employees of Employer A. Therefore, they argued, a union should be permitted to force the employees of Employer B to join the.
union to protect the union members. The success of labor's
position on this issue is shown by the fact that the NLRA,
as interpreted by the NLRB and the courts, has never
forbidden per se picketing with such an object.46
With this brief background of the history of labor relations, we now turn to the Maryland judicial decisions.
In discussing them, it seems practical to divide the cases
" For an illustration of the problem of organizational picketing in recent
years, see the discussion in Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local 639,
119 N.L.R.B. 232, 239 (1957) (the Curtis Brothers case).
" See e.g., Simon v. Schwachman, 301 Mass. 573, 18 N.E. 2d 1 (1938)
Silkworth v. Local No. 575 of American Fed. of Labor, 309 Mich. 746, 16
N.W. 2d 145 (1944) ; Vogt, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
270 Wis. 315, 74 N.W. 2d 749 (1956), aff'd. 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
45 See infra, ps. 250-253, passim.
"See the discussion in Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local 639, 119
N.L.R.B. 232, 239 (1957) (the Curtis Brothers case). For the most recent
congressional view on this subject, see § 8(b) (7) of the NLRA, added by
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.A.
(Cum.Supp. 1959) § 158(b) (7).
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into two classes - decisions of the Court of Appeals, and
decisions of the circuit courts. Only the first class of
decisions are controlling throughout the state, and since
the circuit court cases often concern issues not yet determined by the decisions of the Court of Appeals, it will be
helpful to have clearly in mind which court rendered the
decision under discussion.
DECISIONS OF THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

The first important Court of Appeals case was Lucke
v. Clothing C't'rs' Assembly."
An employee was discharged by his employer at the insistence of a union because the employee was not a member of the union. The
union had implied that it would induce members of the
union to withhold their patronage, and possibly call a
strike, if the employee was not discharged. The employee
had applied for membership in the union, but had been
rejected. The Court held that the employee had the right
to sue the union for damages. It stated that although the
union had the right to seek favorable conditions for its
members, it did not have the right to interfere with the
rights and privileges of non-union labor. The Court noticed the fact that the union had denied membership to
the employee but said that this point was not crucial to its
decision.
The age of the Lucke case - it was decided in 1893 causes doubt as to whether the case still represents the
public policy of Maryland. If it does, then any labor agreement which makes union membership a condition of employment may violate Maryland law, although such agreements are very common today. Perhaps the Lucke case
may be interpreted to mean that a union may not force an
employer to discharge a non-union employee, but that an
employer may voluntarily agree to a contractual provision
which would require such action. However, such a distinction would often be dubious, since the threat of economic force on the part of a union, either expressed or assumed, usually underlies such a provision.
The Lucke case was decided at a time when courts
often held that while it was lawful for a union to use economic force to achieve immediate advantages for its members, such as a wage increase, it was unlawful for a union
to use such force to achieve conditions which would only
benefit the members indirectly, such as the complete
777 Md. 396, 26 A. 505 (1893).
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unionization of an industry.4 8 This view probably affected
the Court's decision to some extent.
It is also possible to explain the case on the ground that
the union's rejection of the employee's application for
membership was a vital factor in the case even though the
Court stated that it was not. Other states have held that
it is contrary to their public policy for a union to demand
the discharge of an employee, to whom it has denied membership, because he is not a union member.4 9 This view
stems from the belief that it is unfair for a union to put an
employee in such a helpless position.
A very important Court of Appeals case is My Maryland Lodge v. Adt. 50 The company was engaged in the
manufacture of machinery, especially machinery used by
the brewing companies of Baltimore. The union demanded
that the company grant to its employees a wage increase
of ten percent. When the company refused, but offered to
grant an increase of three percent, the union called a strike
of the company's machinists. The union also told the company that if the demands of the employees were not met,
the company would be placed on the union's unfair list,
and the union would prevent any person from accepting
employment with the company. Later the union attempted
to force the company to meet its demand by establishing a
boycott of the company's products, and by threatening to
boycott any business which used the machinery of the
company. Several customers which continued to use the
company's machinery were also placed on the unfair list
and made a part of the boycott. The company alleged
that its business had dwindled from $18,000 a year to less
than $3,500 as a consequence of the acts of the union.
The Court of Appeals held that it was proper to issue
an injunction enjoining the union from continuing its boycott activities. In reaching this decision, the Court attempted to formulate a basic theory of lawful and unlawful union activity. It stated that the company was engaged in a lawful business and that the law protects the
right of an employer to employ whom he pleases at prices
which he and his employees can agree upon. Also, an
employer has the further right to discharge his employees
at the expiration of their term of service, or for violation
of their contract. On the other hand, the employees have
4See,
e.g., Plant v. Woods, 176
Local No. 500, U.B. of Carpenters
"ISee, e.g., James v. Marinship
(1944) : Dorrington v. Manning,

"100

Md. 238, 59 A. 721 (1905).

Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900) ; Purvis v.
and Joiners, 214 Pa. 348, 63 A. 585 (1906).
Corporation, 25 Col. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329
135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. 2d 886 (1939).
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a legal right to fix a price for their labor, and to refuse to
work unless that price is obtained. They have that right
both as individuals and in combination, and they may
organize to improve their conditions and to secure better
wages. They may even use persuasion to have others join
their organization and may present their cause to the
public in newspapers or circulars in a peaceful way, but
with no attempt at coercion. If ruin to the employer results from their peaceful assertion of these rights, it is
damage without a remedy; but the law does not permit
either employer or employee to use or threaten to use
force, violence, or coercive tactics.
Although it is clear that the Court of Appeals in the
Adt case thought that the union activity as a whole
amounted to unlawful coercion, it is uncertain whether the
Court would not have condoned some of the activity
standing by itself. The Court stated that the union had the
right to present its cause to the public even though such
action was intended to induce the public to cease using the
products of the company and thus to exert economic pressure on the company. However, the Court also said that
the union could not use coercion, which statement seems
contrary to its prior assertion. This possible contradiction can probably be explained by the fact that the case
involved economic pressure on neutral companies which
were customers of the company involved in the dispute.
Thus, the Court was probably condemning the boycott
of the customers

-

a secondary boycott -

and not the

boycott of the company itself - a primary boycott. Such
a position would be in accord with the general view of
lawful and unlawful boycotts. A later Court of Appeals
case confirms this conclusion by stating that the Court
held in the Adt case that it was illegal for a union to boycott the customers of a company in order to put pressure
on the company."
In Pocketbook Workers v. Orlove,5" the Court of Ap-

peals held that peaceful picketing for a lawful object was
permissible, but that violent and coercive picketing was
unlawful regardless of its purpose. Two companies had
open shops and employed workers without regard to their
membership in a union. A union, which was attempting
to organize the employees of the firms, called a strike because of dissatisfaction over wages and working conditions
and because of the refusal of the firms to deal with the
Blandford v. Duthie, 147 Md. 388, 128 A. 138 (1925).
-158 Md. 496, 148 A. 826 (1930).
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union. The employees who refused to work tried to persuade other employees not to report for work, and pickets
wearing placards announcing the strike walked on the
sidewalk in front of the shops. There was a dispute as to
whether employees who refused to strike were threatened
and whether there were other forms of violence. The
Court of Appeals held that the strike and picketing were
not enjoinable except insofar as there was violence. It
reasoned that the employees had the right to organize a
union, to quit work and strike, and to persuade others to
join them. Such persuasion, so long as it was peaceful,
could be carried on by pickets outside the places of employment. However, the Court also recognized that it was
often difficult to draw a line between coercion and mere
persuasion. It stated that many pickets might just by their
numbers and crowding give occasion to some coercion.
In a series of three cases the Court of Appeals discussed
the problem of the secondary strike - a strike or a threat
to strike Employer A in an attempt to exert pressure on
Employer B. 53 In the first case, Blandford v. Duthie,5 4 a
union had attempted in vain for many years to get a company which did roofing work of various kinds for general
contractors, to employ only union men. In order to injure
the company economically, the union threatened to strike
general contractors who used the company and, in fact,
did strike one general contractor, who after a few weeks
was forced to rescind its contract with the company. The
Court upheld an injunction enjoining such conduct by
the union. It stated that this case was not simply one
of union men exercising their right to refuse to work on
a job on which non-union men were employed. Nothing
showed that the employees of the struck general contractor objected to working on the job; rather, the union
called the strike itself. Such action was unlawful because there was no dispute between the general contractor
and its employees, and thus no justification for interference with the contract between the general contractor and
the company. It is interesting to note that the Court
expressly recognized the right of the union men to refuse
to work with non-union men of their own volition, but
condemned the union's part in instigating the strike. Such
a view accords with the policy of the NLRA which makes
In the language of labor law this type of activity is usually referred
to as a secondary boycott even though there is no "boycott" In the normal
sense. However, for purposes of clarity of thinking this article will use
the term "secondary strike" to describe such activity.
Supra, n. 51.
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it an unfair labor practice for a union to induce employees
to strike in various situations, but which does not prohibit
employees from stopping work on their own initiative.5
The rationale of the Blandford case was followed in
Bricklayers' Etc. Union v. Ruff. 56 A company engaged in
the business of stonemasonry entered into a written contract with a general contractor to do all of the stonemasonry work connected with the erection of a church.
The company began the work and employed only union
labor; however, the general contractor employed nonunion labor, and the union ordered all of the union men
working for the company to quit work so long as the
general contractor continued to employ non-union men.
When the company was unable to finish the work, the
general contractor cancelled the contract and employed
others to finish the work at the risk and expense of the
company. The Court of Appeals held that the union was
liable to the company for causing a breach of the contract
with the general contractor which resulted in substantial
damages. The Court stated that if the non-union men had
been working for the company, it would have been proper
for the union men to refuse to work on the same job with
the non-union men, and thus force the company to grant
all work to union men. In such case, the dispute would
have been directly with the party against whom the strike
was ordered. But here, injury was inflicted upon an innocent party in order to compel it to coerce the general contractor. The company had no power to coerce the general
contractor into employing only union men, and even if it
had such power, it had the undoubted right to elect not
to do so. Organized labor's right of coercion and compulsion was thus judically limited to strikes against those
employers directly involved in a trade dispute.
A later decision involving the same parties as the last
case confused this area considerably. Ruff & Sons v. Bricklayers' Union 7 arose out of the union's maneuver to avoid
the effect of the earlier decision against it. It changed its
constitution to provide that no member of the union could
work for a subcontractor who took a contract from a general contractor employing non-union labor. The union then
advised the company that no members of the union would
work for the company if it continued to enter into contracts with non-union general contractors. The Court of
Appeals held that the action of the union was not enjoinSee, e.g., United Steelworkers of America, 123 N.L.R.B. 20 (1959).
160 Md. 483, 154 A. 52 (1931).
163 Md. 687, 164 A. 752 (1933).
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able, since the facts in this case were different from those
in the earlier Ruff case. In the former case, a strike was
called not to discipline the company with whom there was
no controversy, but to induce a breach of the contract
between the company and a general contractor in an effort
to compel the latter to discontinue the employment of
non-union labor. In this case, there was no existing contract, so the company would not be injured by the refusal
of its employees to work. Nor was there a third party involved in the controversy, which involved only the company and the union.
The reasoning of the Court in this case seems contrary
to its position in the earlier secondary-strike cases, and
the attempt to distinguish the earlier cases is perplexing.
It seems to be mere verbiage to say that in the earlier Ruff
case the controversy was with the general contractor but
that in the present case the controversy was with the company itself. The facts in the two cases are identical in substance. In both cases the union would not allow union men
employed by the company to work with non-union men
employed by the general contractor. In both cases the
only purpose of the union action was to force the general
contractor to use union labor - the company was already
using union labor and its employment practices apparently
were acceptable to the union. The Court also mentioned
the fact that in the earlier Ruff case there was a contract
in existence while in the later case there was not. However, it is not clear why this difference should be important.
By analogy to tort law, it may be a tort to force a person
to breach his contract with another; but it also may be a
tort to interfere with an advantageous relationship not yet
consummated by a contract.5 8 As far as the harm to a company is concerned, it may be far more harmful to be
threatened with loss of all future contracts with non-union
companies than to be faced with the breach of one contract already in existence.
A possible way to support the Court's distinction in
these cases is to say that the earlier cases involved actual
strikes while the later case involved only a threat to
strike. The Court might have believed that a court of
equity should not intervene until something more than
mere threats has occurred. In Lucke v. Clothing C't'rs'
Assembly,59 the union had also merely threatened to strike
or boycott the employer, but the employer had taken the
See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) 49, § 766.
77 Md. 396, 26 A. 505 (1893). See supra,ps. 244-245.
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further step of discharging the employee who was the
object of the union's attack. Therefore, the harm intended
by the union's threats actually occurred, and perhaps this
distinction explains why the Court allowed damages in
the Lucke case but refused an injunction in the second
Ruff case. On the other hand, courts of equity have often
enjoined threatened harm,6" and on final analysis it seems
that these cases are fundamentally irreconcilable.
DECISIONS OF THE MARYLAND CIRCUIT COURTS

Several reported Maryland circuit court decisions in
this area date from after the passage of the Maryland AntiInjunction Act6 1 and therefore are affected by the Act. As
discussed more fully above,6 2 this act completely prevents
Maryland courts from enjoining some types of union
activity and requires detailed procedural steps before any
union activity may be enjoined. However, the act applies
only to cases involving labor disputes, and the chief issue
in these circuit court cases was whether they involved a
labor dispute as defined in the statute. If they did not, then
the statutory restrictions on the equity power of the courts
would not apply, and the courts could deal with the union
activity involved on general equitable principles.
In deciding whether a labor dispute was involved, the
Maryland circuit courts, like many other state courts interpreting similar anti-injunction acts of their respective
states, 63 used the means and objectives test which had
existed prior to the passage of the act. 4 If the type of
union activity in question, or the objective of such activity,
was prohibited by prior judicial decisions or by the public
policy of the state, then no labor dispute was involved and
the statute did not apply. By adopting such a flexible
view, the Maryland courts were able to remove many cases
from the seemingly broad statutory definition of a labor
dispute when the courts believed that such cases were not
intended to fall under the act.
Wischhusen v. Griffin65 involved a tavern which had
several coin-operated machines. The owner of a music
machine employed two non-union employees to service this
0 See,

e.g., Clark v. Todd, 192 Md. 487, 64 A. 2d 547 (1949).

8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, §§ 63-75.

- See supra, ps. 239-241.
See, e.g., Pleasant Valley Packing Co. v. Talarico, 5 N.Y. 2d 40, 152
N.E. 2d 505 (1958) ; Bonwit Teller & Co. of Phila. v. District 65, Etc., 393
Pa. 324, 142 A. 2d 193 (1958).
See supra, ps. 242-243.
S23 CCH Labor Cases
67,683 (Cir. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore, 1953).
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machine and other machines owned by him. The owner of
two pinball machines personally serviced these machines
and other machines owned by him. A union was attempting to organize the owners and operators of coin
machines and their employees in Maryland and the District of Columbia. The union attempted to get the owner
of the pinball machines to sign a contract governing his
services, and it tried to get the owner of the music machine to sign a contract governing the services of his
employees, as well as himself, even though the employees
had specifically stated that they did not want to be represented by the union. When both men refused to sign the
contracts, or to join the union, the union started to picket
the tavern with signs asking patrons not to use the machines because they were not serviced by members of the
union. Most of the patrons belonged to some union, and as
a result of the picketing, some patrons refused to enter the
tavern, although the exact loss of business could not be
ascertained. The court held that the picketing was enjoinable on several grounds. First, the picketing was an attempt to bring pressure upon the owners of the machines
by forcing the tavern owner to stop dealing with them and
therefore constituted an unlawful secondary boycott. It
was also held to be unlawful as an attempt to bring pressure upon a self-employer to force him to join a union.
Further, picketing to compel an employer to force his employees to be represented by a union against the employees'
will violated the Maryland Anti-Injunction Act in that the
union was attempting to deny the employees involved
the right to be represented by representatives of their own
choice. Thus, there was no legitimate labor dispute and
the provisions of the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply.
The first point mentioned by the court was clearly supported by the Court of Appeals decisions discussed above
which prohibit secondary pressure.6 6 The second point that it was unlawful to force a self-employer to join a
union - is not directly supported by any decision of the
Court of Appeals. However, it seems basic to the general
view of labor relations in this country that unions, which
serve to represent employees in their relations with employers, have no right to represent employers against their
will. Since 1947 it has been an unfair labor practice under
the NLRA for a union to induce a strike to force an employer or a self-employed person to join any labor or" See supra, ps. 247-248, passim.
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ganization 7 In 1959 the act was amended to prohibit a
union from threatening, coercing, or restraining any person
to achieve such an objective. 8 Thus the amendment seems
to make unlawful in the federal sphere the kind of activity
involved in the Wischhusen case. The third point - that
it was unlawful to force an employer to interfere with his
employees' choice of a bargaining representative - also has
no support in a Court of Appeals decision, but seems to
accord with Maryland policy as set forth in the AntiInjunction Act. The act declares the policy of the state
to be that:
"....

it is necessary that the individual workman have

full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing . ..
and that he shall be free from interference, restraint or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization ..."69

It would be clearly violative of this policy for an employer,
on his own initiative, to interfere with his employees'
selection of a bargaining representative, and it seems
equally violative for a union to force an employer to do so.
The third principle of the Wischhusen case - that it
is unlawful for a union to seek to represent employees
against their will - was followed in a later case which also
was decided in Baltimore. In Goldstein v. Bartenders
Union, Local No. 36,70 five of the eighteen or nineteen
employees of a tavern joined a union. Representatives of
the union told the owner of the tavern that the union
represented a majority of his employees. The owner asked
to see the names of the members and stated that if the
union did represent a majority, he would negotiate a contract with it. The union refused on the ground that the
owner might discriminate against the union members and
started to picket in front of and in the rear of the tavern.
Several days later, five employees who had joined the
union returned to work and stated that they did not want
the union to represent them. However, the picket line
continued. After finding that the business did not so affect
interstate commerce as to fall under the NLRA, the court
held that an injunction should issue. It stated that the
-29 U.S.C.A. (1956) § 158(b) (4) (A).
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.A.
(Curn. Supp. 1959) § 158(b) (4) (A).
S8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, § 63.
71,020 (Cir. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore, 1957).
3.3CCH Labor Cases
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Maryland Anti-Injunction Act applies only if there is a
labor dispute, and that under the facts of the case, there
was no labor dispute since the purpose of the picketing to require the employer to recognize the union although the
union did not represent his employees - violated the
public policy of the state.
It is important to note that the two cases just discussed
both represented situations in which a union sought recognition as the bargaining representative of employees who
had renounced the union. In Cox DistributingCo. v. Highway Truck Drivers, Local 107,71 the position of the union
was stronger. Eight of the nine truck drivers of a company
became members of the union, which requested the company to recognize it as the bargaining representative of the
drivers. The company refused, and the eight union drivers
went on strike. They also picketed the company with the
help of two union organizers and other unidentified persons. The company replaced the eight drivers and leased
two tractor-trailer units to deliver its products to its customers. During the strike and picketing, various acts of
violence were performed by unknown persons. The court
held that the peaceful union activity could not be enjoined.
It stated that a strike and picketing for recognition was
clearly a labor dispute within the meaning of the Maryland Anti-Injunction Act and that therefore no injunction
could issue unless the court found that the police had failed
or were unable to furnish adequate protection, and that
notice of hearing had been given to all known persons
against whom relief was sought. In the instant case, failure
of police protection was not alleged and notice of hearing
was not given. Because of such procedural defects, an
injunction would have been improper. The court also discussed the rule set forth in the Supreme Court cases, that
while a state court is not preempted from enjoining violence connected with picketing, it may not enjoin peaceful
picketing itself unless the picketing is so enmeshed with
the violence and the threat of violence that the two activities are inseparable. 72 It held that in this case the violence
was separable from the peaceful picketing and thus that all
picketing could not be enjoined.
Although there are only a few reported Maryland cases
dealing with recognitional picketing, the three cases just
discussed, and Pocketbook Workers v. Orlove 8 in the Court
of Appeals, present a pattern, although a sketchy one. The
35 CCH Labor Cases
71,646 (Cir. Ct. of Talbot 0o., 1958).
71See supra, Ps. 234-236.
158 Md. 496, 148 A. 826 (1930).
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Wischhusen and Goldstein cases hold that it is against the
public policy of Maryland for a union to force a company
to recognize it as the representative of the company's employees when all of the employees have rejected the union.
On the other hand, the Cox case holds that it is not against
the policy of the state for a union which represents a
majority of a company's employees to picket for recognition. Thus far the Maryland decisions accord with the
principles of the NLRA, which basically provide for a system of majority rule in representation cases."4 In the
Orlove case the Court of Appeals condoned picketing for
recognition by a union which represented some of the employees of a company without questioning whether the
union represented a majority of the employees. Thus,
while the Court necessarily held that recognitional picketing was not unlawful per se, it did not consider the question whether a union engaging in such picketing must have
the support of a majority of the employees whom the
union seeks to represent. In fact, there does not seem to
be any Maryland case which decides the legality of recognitional picketing by a union which has the support of
some, but not a majority, of the employees of a company.
In deciding such a question, a court may reach different
results depending upon whether the union wants to represent all of the employees of the company, the employees
of certain departments, or only those employees who support the union. In any event, this problem, which has
proved very troublesome in federal law, 4a remains open in
Maryland law.
One other Maryland case should be mentioned, even
though the opinion was apparently given orally and contains no citation of authority. In Standard Wholesale
Phosphate and Acid Works v. CIO,75 the company refused
to sign a contract containing a closed-shop provision. The
union called a strike, in which only a small part of the
employees participated, and established a picket line at
the entrance to the company. Another company, a neutral
party, suffered because it shared the same entrance, and
union men, such as truck drivers, often would not cross the
picket line to reach the company. Also, a ship which unloaded behind the picket line was struck by another union,
apparently in sympathy for the strikers. The court held
that the picketing was lawful since it was peaceful and
that the sympathetic strike was also lawful since it was
§ 159(a).
See, e.g., Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
,5Daily Record, Dec. 1, 1939 (Cir. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore, 1939).
•'29 U.S.C.A. (1956)
7f
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only an application of the principle that union men will
not work behind a picket line. This case is interesting because it raises difficult problems regarding the legality of
two different types of union pressure on neutral employers.
First, the refusal of union men to cross the picket line
affected two companies at the same location, one involved
in the labor dispute and the other neutral. To the lawyer
practicing federal labor law such a situation raises familiar,
although difficult, questions of common situs picketing.
Such picketing must meet very specific standards to be
legal under federal law - such as clear indication of the
company involved in the dispute and minimization of the
effects of the picketing on other companies. 6 This case,
however, appears to permit such picketing without restriction. Second, the sympathetic strike brings to mind
the secondary strike cases in the Court of Appeals."' This
case differs from those cases in that here two unions were
involved, whereas in the Court of Appeals cases the union
which called the strike at the neutral company was also
the union involved at the primary company. It is not clear
whether this difference should be important. However, the
court assumed that the sympathetic strike was proper
without discussion of the Court of Appeals cases.
UNIONIZATION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN MARYLAND

Thus far the cases discussed have dealt with union
activity directed against private employers. One series of
Maryland cases, which may have far-reaching consequences
in the future, deals with the attempt of a union to organize
and bargain for the employees of a government agency.
During the early 1940's there was a history of labor
troubles among the street-cleaning and trash-and-garbage
collection employees of the Department of Public Works
of Baltimore City. Frequent work stoppages, which
threatened to paralyze the important services of the Department, resulted from the attempt of a union to gain
recognition as the representative of these employees.
Finally the Department recognized the union and signed
several collective bargaining agreements with it. The
cases now under discussion dealt with the legality of these
agreements.
See, e.g., Piezonki v. National Labor Relations Board, 219 F. 2d 879 (4th
Cir. 1955); Sailors' Union of the Pacific (the Moore Dry Dock case), 92
N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
77See supra, ps. 247-250, pas8im.
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Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore8 involved a taxpayer's suit that was filed to enjoin the enforcement of one of these contracts, which provided for
union recognition, hours of work, rates of pay, overtime
and holiday pay, vacations, sick pay, seniority rules, a
grievance procedure, and arbitration. The contract expressly provided that there would be no strike under any
circumstances. In holding that the contract was illegal, the
court distinguished between public and private employment on the ground that public officers, who are not
governed by a profit motive, do not have the same incentive
to exploit employees. It also stated that public officers do
not have the same freedom of action which private employers enjoy, since their authority derives from public
law and may not be delegated to others. Governmental
authority may not discriminate in favor of union labor,
and the right to hire non-union labor, to fire union members, and to hear and consider the grievances of all employees must be preserved. Also, there must be no strikes
against the government. On the other hand, the court said
that every agreement between a labor union and municipal
officers is not unlawful since no law forbids city employees
to join an association, nor denies to such an association the
privilege of fair hearing in the matter of working conditions and terms of employment.
Having decided that the agreement was illegal, the
court next had to decide whether it had the power to
grant an injunction in face of the Maryland Anti-Injunction
Act. It held that it did have such power since the act was
not intended to apply to public officials.
While this case was pending, the city and the union
entered into a new agreement, which was similarly attacked in a taxpayer's suit as being unlawful. The new
case was also entitled Mugford v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore.7 9 The agreement provided that the Department of Public Works recognized the union as the bargaining representative for the employees of the Department and that the Department would not recognize or
deal with any other union as regards such employees. The
court held that this provision was unlawful in that it
established the union in a preferential position expressly
denied to any other organization, and that such preferences
are forbidden in the public service. It said that the contract
would not have been objectionable if it merely had given
CCH Labor Cases
9 CCH Labor Cases
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62,137 (Cir. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore, 1944).
62,424 (Cir. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore, 1944).
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the union the right to act as bargaining representative for
its members employed in the Department, saving to the
other employees of the Department the right to deal with
the Department on their own behalf either singly or collectively. The court also stated, however, that the provisions for holidays, vacations, sick leave, overtime pay,
and the deduction of union dues on a voluntary basis were
lawful.
In its decree the court enjoined the city from carrying
out the agreement and from collecting union dues unless
the collection and remittance of such dues was on a purely
voluntary basis terminable by any employee at any time.
Neither the city nor the union appealed from this decree;
however, the taxpayer appealed on the ground that the
part of the injunction permitting voluntary deduction of
dues was unlawful. The Court of Appeals held ° that if the
city made dues deductions at the request of the union, even
though the deductions were terminable by the employees,
the arrangement would be objectionable as a delegation of
governmental power and as a preference to the union.
However, if a city employee voluntarily requested the
deduction of union dues, reserving to himself the right to
discontinue such payments in the future, such an arrangement would be lawful if the city consented to it, but it
could not be imposed without the city's consent.
Although the Court of Appeals was not asked to review
the remainder of the decree, it nevertheless did so to some
extent. It stated that insofar as matters such as hours,
wages, or working conditions of city employees are covered
by the provisions of the City Charter, those provisions are
controlling. To the extent that they are left to the discretion of any city agency, the city authorities cannot
delegate or abdicate their continuing discretion. However,
employees may designate a representative or spokesman to
present grievances. The court also mentioned that a
municipality cannot discriminate in favor of members of
a labor union, and that a citizen who is not a member of
a union cannot, by that fact alone, be barred from a position in the public service.
At first glance the series of Mugford cases does not
seem too important since it is a fairly well-established
principle in this country that union activity directed
against government agencies should be restricted in some
.8 Mugford v. City of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A. 2d 745 (1945).
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manner."' However, these cases may have an influence
outside of the area of government agencies. First, the
Court of Appeals apparently concurred in the view of the
lower court that the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply to
public bodies, and that therefore an injunction was permissible. Otherwise the Court would not have taken the
trouble to define the scope of the injunction in regard to
the deduction of union dues. Thus the Court of Appeals
seems to recognize that the broad statutory definition of
a case involving a labor dispute is subject to exceptions
when required by the public policy of the state. Such a
principle would be relevant in any labor injunction case,
not only in those involving government agencies.
Second, it is arguable that these cases stand for the
proposition that it is against the public policy of Maryland
for a union to attempt to force its wishes on employers
who have some of the characteristics of a public body. The
scope of the "public body" concept may possibly be extended to include organizations which are not strictly
government agencies but which perform governmental
functions, such as hospitals which include among their
patients indigent persons referred by the state or one of
its subdivisions. 2 Also, as regards non-profit hospitals
serving the general public, it would seem that such institutions serve the general welfare without regard to profit
in a manner akin to a government agency, and that therefore the rationale of the Mugford cases may apply equally
to them. 3 At the present time, however, it is impossible to
predict with any certainty how the Maryland law will
develop in this area.
PICKETING IN A SHOPPING CENTER

In recent years the growth of shopping centers has
created difficult questions regarding the right of a union to
picket. The basic problem has been whether the owners of
shopping centers may lawfully prohibit picketing on their
private property. There is very little authority on this
See, e.g., Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269,
83 A. 2d 482 (1951) ; Benson v. School District No. 1 of Silver Bow County,
344 P. 2d 117 (Mont., 1959).
12Cf. Mount Sinai Hospital, Inc. v. Davis, 188 N.Y.S. 2d 338 (1959);
Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581, 300 N.Y.S. 111.1
(M17).

" For

a discussion of the question of union activity affecting hospitals, see

Zachary and Strauss, The Non-profit Hospital and the Union, 9 Buffalo L.
Rev. 255 (1960).
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point at the present time, 4 and one of the few reported
cases was decided in 1959 by the Criminal Court of Baltimore City. In State v. Williams,15 a union business agent
was charged with criminal trespass for picketing on the
walkways of a Baltimore shopping center outside of a
store with which the union had a dispute. Although the
picketing was peaceful and did not interfere with customers in the shopping center, it was conducted in disregard of a posted sign prohibiting any type of solicitation,
including picketing. The business agent was convicted
before a police magistrate but was found not guilty on
appeal to the Criminal Court.
The court based its decision generally on two grounds:
(1) Because the shopping center had been opened to the
public, the constitutional and statutory right to picket
took precedence over the normal rights of the owners of
private property; (2) Federal law regarding picketing had
preempted the jurisdiction of the state court. On the first
point, the court recognized the constitutional right to
picket and cited Thornhill v. Alabama," discussed above. 7
It next cited federal cases which contained language to
the effect that in some instances the rights of an employer
as to his property must yield to the rights of employees
under federal statutes.8 The court stated that the controlling case was Marsh v. Alabama,89 where the United
States Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for
a state to convict a person for distributing religious literature on the streets and sidewalks of a town in which all of
the property, including the streets and sidewalks, was
owned by a private corporation. The court emphasized the
"See Nahas v. Local 905, Retail Clerks, 144 Cal. App. 2d 808, 301 P. 2d
9W2, rehearing den. 144 Cal. App. 2d 820, 302 P. 2d 829 (2d Dist. 1956)
(decided on the ground that the picketing was not a trespass as regarded
the plaintiff, who was only a lessee) ; People v. Mazo, 38 CCH Labor Cases
65,83 (Cir. Ct. Ill., 1959); Hearn Dep't. Stores v. Livingston, 23 CCH
Labor Cases
67,654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1953) (picketing by employees who
had an easement to use a private street) ; People v. Barisi, 15 CCH Labor
Cases
64,890 (N.Y.C. Mag. Ct., 1948) ; Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union
Local No. 1207, 38 CCH Labor Cases 66,037 (Sup. Ct. Wash., 1959). -But
cf. Spohrer v. Cohen, 3 Misc. 2d 248, 149 N.Y.S. 2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1956)
(involving a farmers market). See also, Note, Shopping Centers and Labor
Relations Law, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 694 (1958).
"137 CCH Labor Cases
65,708 (Crim. Ct. of Baltimore, 1959), noted 73
Harv, L. Rev. 1216 (1900).
-310 U.S. 88 (1940).
87 See supra, circa, ps. 237-238.
'The court cited Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105
(1956) ; Labor Board v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949) ; Republic
Aviation Corp. v. Board, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) ; National Labor R. Board v.
Cities Service Oil Co., 122 F. 2d 149 (2d Cir. 1941).
"326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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Supreme Court's language in the Marsh case that "the
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property
for use by the public in general, the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional
rights of those who use it." 9 The purpose of this language
in the Marsh case was to show that the company town was
in effect indistinguishable from a municipal corporation
and consequently was bound by the restrictions of the
Fourteenth Amendment regarding freedom of religion and
speech. Thus it is possible to distinguish a shopping center
case from the Marsh case on the ground that a shopping
center is not comparable to a municipal corporation and is
therefore not as limited in its actions. On the other hand,
the Marsh case does support to some extent the court's
view that when property is opened to the public, the property rights of the owner are more limited than in the usual
case.
On the second point, the court noted the line of Supreme
Court cases, discussed above, 91 holding that a state court
may not regulate union activity which is either protected
or prohibited by federal law unless violence is involved.
The court pointed out that one case indicates that a union
may have a federal right to picket in a shopping center.
92
In Marshall Field & Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd.,
the Seventh Circuit held that under the NLRA a company
could not prohibit solicitation by non-employee union organizers on a private street which was owned by the company and which bisected the main store of the company
at street level. It is possible to distinguish this case from a
case involving a shopping center. In the Williams case it
was argued to the court that since the union's dispute was
not with the owner of the shopping center but with one of
the lessees, the owner had no duty under federal law to
permit union activity on its property. However, the court
stated that such a view would nullify the union's federal
rights and added that the owner might be found to have
been acting as an agent of the lessee. The agency question
is certainly a difficult one, especially in view of the close
economic relationship which exists between lessor and
lessee in a shopping center as a result of the prevalence of
percentage leases. The Marshall Field case is also distinguishable on the ground that picketing in a shopping center
-Ibid., 505-506.
See supra,ps. 231-236.
2200
F. 2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952).
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is far more disruptive of business than is solicitation of
individual employees on a private street.
The court, however, concluded that it did not have to
decide whether the picketing actually enjoyed federal
protection, for under the recent Supreme Court decision in
San Diego Unions v. Garmon,93 discussed above,94 a state
court is preempted whenever it is doubtful whether activity
is so protected and the NLRB has not passed on the issue.
Although the ramifications of the Garmon case are not yet
completely clear, the court's cautious attitude is understandable considering the tenor of the Garmon opinion.
As shown by the previous discussion, the issues raised
by picketing in a shopping center are extremely close.
Several other courts have decided cases similar to the
Williams case in the same manner as the Maryland court.9 5
Nevertheless, until these issues are determined by the
Maryland Court of Appeals, or at least until the federal law
questions are determinea by the NLRB or the federal
courts, the legality of picketing in a shopping center will
remain an open question.9 6
CONCLUSION

As shown by the cases discussed above, the Maryland
judicial decisions provide only the outlines of a law
of strikes, boycotts, and picketing. Combined with the
sparsity of state legislation in this area, this situation poses
a difficult problem for the Maryland labor lawyer. The
problem is made even more complicated by the fact that
the latest Court of Appeals decision concerning private
employers dates from 1933. It is difficult to predict whether
the Court of Appeals would follow these decisions today
since labor law in general has undergone various changes
in policy through the years in accordance with the changes
in the labor movement. The infant raised by Samuel
Gompers and Eugene V. Debs has grown into the giant
guided by George Meany, Walter Reuther, and many
others.
w359 U.S. 236 (1959).
supra, ps. 231-233.
9People v. Mazo, 38 CCH Labor Cases
65,835 (Cir. Ct. of Ill., 1959)
People v. Barisi, 15 CCH Labor Cases
64,890 (N.Y.C. Mag. Ct. 1948)
Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union Local No. 1207, 38 CCH Labor Cases
66,037 (Super. Ct. of Wash., 1959).
"The issues considered by the court in the Williams case, although difficult enough in themselves, do not exhaust the questions involved in this
area. One obvious problem which arises whenever there is picketing in a
shopping center is whether such activity violates the secondary boycott
restrictions of the NLRA.
"See
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The Court of Appeals itself recognized that the judicial
view of union activity may vary according to the times,
when it stated:
"The main question, heretofore stated, requires a
decision as to the powers of organized labor to compel
or coerce action for the benefit of its members. Courts,
in deciding cases involving this question, recognizing
the possible far-reaching effect of any rule or principle
enunciated, should and do approach the question with
caution, and have generally refrained from doing more
than deciding the case upon its peculiar facts, leaving
each succeeding case to be determined in like manner,
and giving effect to the development of the law as
illustrated by the decisions, and also permitting the
court to take cognizance of general conditions as they
may exist at the time of the decision; thus enabling
the courts to maintain an even balance between the
rights of workmen, either individually or in combination, and equal rights guaranteed to all individuals
under the law. The line of demarcation where one
man's rights, natural or legal, may end, because in
conflict with the exercise of some right by others, is
shadowy, and'97is not the subject of definement by any
general rule.
Taking the course of the federal labor law as an illustration of the change in labor law over the years, the federal
courts during the early part of this century were very
restrictive of the rights of labor, and even questioned its
right to form unions in face of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.98 The Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 191499 ended this
specific problem by expressly sanctioning the right of labor
to organize. Nevertheless, the courts continued to hamper
the activities of unions by means of injunctions issued
under a strict view of the means and objectives test.' °
Again in 1933 Congress limited the power of the judiciary
by enacting the Norris-La Guardia Act, 10' which greatly
restricted the jurisdiction of the federal courts to grant
labor injunctions. In 1935 the NLRA gave employees the

IRuff

& Sons v.

Bricklayers

Union, 160 Md. 483, 492-93, 154 A.

52,

56 (1931).

Is See e.g., United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill., 1894), aff'd.

on other grounds, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
-15

U.S.C.A. (1951) § 17.

100See. e.g., Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) ; Inter-

national Organization, United Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Oonsol. Coal &
Coke Co., 18 F. 2' 839 (4th Cir.), cert. den. 275 U.S. 536 (1927).
129 U.S.C.A. (1956) §§ 101-10, 113-15.
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right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to act in concert for their welfare; at the same time, Congress made
it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with this right. ' The effect of this series of statutes was
to give the labor movement federal encouragement. However, labor became guilty of various excesses as it became
more powerful, and in 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act'013 made
many union practices unlawful. The most recent federal
legislation has again restricted the actions of unions in
regard to both union members and employers.' 4
This brief description of the course of federal labor law
shows that because of the various changes in national
sentiment toward labor through the years, the Court of
Appeals will probably have to re-examine its former labor
decisions when and if the occasion arises. It may take a more
restrictive view of union activity, a less restrictive view, or
it may decide to affirm its former view. In any event, the
Maryland labor lawyer will be forced to cope with the uncertainty of the state's labor law until the legislature or the
Court of Appeals provides some clarification.
- 29 U.S.C.A. (1956)

§§ 157, 158(a).

10329 U.S.C.A. (1956)

§ 158(b).

101Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519
t1959), 29 U.S.C.A. (Cum. Supp. 1959).

